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In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts the use of
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitration clauses that foreclose
classwide remedies.' The Court found that requiring the availability of
classwide arbitration raises costs and prolongs disputes, thereby interfering
with the "fundamental attributes of arbitration" at the core of the FAA.2 The
majority construed the FAA to allow for the invalidation of arbitration clauses
"by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability,' but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that
derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.' 3
The five-to-four decision in Concepcion was quickly lambasted as brazenly
conservative4 and anti-consumer.5 More recently, some scholars have raised a
different concern: that Concepcion signals the federal colonization of state
contract law. 6 Casting aside Justice Brandeis's observation that "a single
courageous state" must sometimes be permitted to "serve as a laboratory,"7 the
Supreme Court has instead insisted that the presence of an arbitration clause
1. 131 S. Ct. 174o, 1748 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1746 (quoting Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
4. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 9o DENY. U. L. REV. 317, 317
(2012).
S. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 9o OR. L. REV. 703, 724 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 153, 155 & n.8 (2014). Drahozal's incisive piece on Concepcion, which touches on many
of the same themes explored here, went to press while this Comment was being edited.
7. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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prevents state-court judges from applying contract defenses on which they had
previously relied for decades.8
How much of state contract law remains after Concepcion? During the past
several years, state courts have been engaged in a tug-of-war with the Supreme
Court over the answer to this question. In 2012 and 2013, several state courts
developed theories under which Concepcion could be cabined or read narrowly.
The Supreme Court then invalidated the most promising of those theories in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. In that case, the Court held
that class-arbitration waivers cannot be invalidated as unconscionable even
when the cost of individually arbitrating a statutory claim vastly exceeds the
potential recovery.9 After Italian Colors, state judges tugged back yet again,
deploying new readings of Concepcion that left room for state courts to refuse to
enforce at least some forced-arbitration clauses."0
This Comment explores the vitality of state contract law after Concepcion.
In the three years since the case was decided, state courts have developed a
number of innovative, narrow readings of Concepcion. These readings, taken
together with other opinions that have sought to limit the scope of FAA
preemption, show that state-court judges are eager to protect their traditional
role as the final arbiter of contracts.
Part I catalogues recent state-court approaches to forced-arbitration
clauses, focusing in particular on four arguments: (1) Concepcion forecloses the
use of unconscionability doctrine only when the application of that doctrine
would interfere with the "fundamental attributes of arbitration"; (2) Concepcion
applies to categorical but not case-by-case unconscionability analysis;
(3) Concepcion does not prevent state courts from interrogating the
conscionability of the formation of the entire contract; and (4) "arbitration"
might be defined narrowly so as to limit the scope of FAA preemption.
Building on these theories, Part II suggests a more ambitious avenue for
innovation within the space left open by Concepcion. By applying duress
doctrine to certain contracts containing forced-arbitration clauses, state courts
8. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746-48 (limiting the use ofunconscionability analysis).
9. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013). Although Italian Colors involved a claim under a federal
antitrust statute, courts have concluded that the reasoning of Italian Colors travels to causes
of action based in state law. See, e.g., Machado v. System4 LLC, 993 N.E.2d 332, 333 (Mass.
2013). The U.S. Supreme Court itself recently signaled that the applicability of Italian Colors
should not vary based on whether the underlying claim sounds in state or federal law. See
CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC v. Fowler, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014) (vacating a
decision that had applied "effective-vindication" theory in a case involving a state-law cause
of action).
lo. See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Sonic I/), 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014).
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and arbitrators" may be able to protect lay claimants while still remaining
faithful to Supreme Court precedent.
I. NARROW READINGS OF CONCEPCION
Many state courts have read Concepcion broadly, concluding that it requires
judges to enforce nearly all arbitration agreements.12 Others have applied
Concepcion, but have done so while casting doubts on its wisdom. 3 Still other
courts -particularly those of California, Massachusetts, Missouri, and
Washington -have read Concepcion narrowly. These readings of Concepcion can
be grouped into four broad categories.
A. Unconscionability Analysis Survives Concepcion
In 2005, the California Supreme Court held in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court that it was categorically unconscionable to enforce a class-arbitration
waiver in a case involving a forced-arbitration clause in a consumer contract
and a predictably small amount of damages.'4 In Concepcion, the Supreme
Court indicated that the Discover Bank rule was preempted because it
"interfere[d] with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[d]
a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."'" As examples of rules interfering with
the fundamental attributes of arbitration, the Court listed contract defenses
that conditioned the enforcement of an arbitration clause on the use of a jury,
the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or the use of court-monitored
discovery.'
6
These three examples do little to resolve the question of which attributes of
arbitration are "fundamental." Some commentators have adopted a broad
ii. For a discussion of where the duress theory could be argued, see infra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., McKenzie Check Advance of Florida, LLC v. Betts, 112 So. 3 d 1176, 1183 (Fla. 2013);
Quails v. Alpine Direct Servs., LLC, 2012 WL 2375272 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); York v.
Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 749 S.E.2d 139, 153 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); Aldridge v. Thrift
Fin. Mktg., LLC, 376 S.W. 3d 877, 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012); Cottonwood Fin., Ltd. v. Estes,
81o N.W.2d 852, 858 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012).
13. See, e.g., LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. Mclllwain, 429 S.W.3 d 261, 265 (Ark. 2013); Schnuerle v.
Insight Commc'ns Co., 376 S.W.3 d 561, 569 (Ky. 2012); see also Kelker v. Geneva-Roth
Ventures, Inc., 303 P.3 d 777, 787 (Mont. 2013) (Baker, J., dissenting).
14. 113 P.3 d 11oo, 111o (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1751-52 (2011).
is. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
16. Id. at 1747.
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definition of "fundamental attributes of arbitration," concluding that the FAA
preempts the imposition of any contract defense that makes arbitration "more
formal, costlier, or less efficient." 7 Others have concluded that the
"fundamental attributes of arbitration" may be narrower, and that only
contract defenses that are closely analogous to the Court's examples should be
struck down. 8 The California Supreme Court recently weighed in on this
question in Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Sonic II). Justice Goodwin Liu's
opinion for the majority persuasively argued that the Concepcion Court
intended the "fundamental attributes of arbitration" to include low costs,
efficiency, speed of dispute resolution, and expert adjudicators.' 9
Significantly, Concepcion does not entirely foreclose the use of
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate forced-arbitration clauses.2" On the
contrary, state-court judges can use unconscionability rules to police
arbitration clauses so long as such rules do not interfere with the "fundamental
attributes of arbitration."2 For example, California courts have found that
17. Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing Viability of
Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 403, 449 (2013).
18. Drahozal, supra note 6, at 165 & n.67.
19. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Sonic II), 311 P.3 d 184, 290 (Cal. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2724 (2014).
20. See Michael A. Helfand, Purpose, Precedent, and Politics: Why Concepcion Covers Less Than
You Think, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 126, 128 (2012).
21. Concepcion did not address the question of whether the forum is itself a fundamental
attribute of arbitration. This leaves open an interesting possibility: states could create
arbitration agencies to hear claims arising under state statutes. States could also provide for
various procedural protections within these arbitrations, such as the availability of counsel
and translators. As long as these new arbitration agencies safeguarded the fundamental
attributes of arbitration by providing speedy and informal dispute resolution, they would
not be preempted by the FAA. Although it would be difficult to ensure that arbitration
agencies provided quick remedies, it would not be impossible. See Judith S. McIlwee,
Comment, Circuit City Meets the California Labor Commissioner: Does the FAA Preempt
Administrative Claims?, 40 CAL. W. L. REv. 383, 396-97 & n.124 (2004) (discussing
California's administrative procedure for handling employment disputes, which has
speedily resolved nearly two million cases). Once the agencies existed, consumers
could apply market pressure to force companies to designate the agencies
as arbitrators. See Cheerios Backtracks: It's OK to "Like" Without Losing Your
Rights, NBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2014, 12:12 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business
/consumer/cheerios-backtracks-its-ok-without-losing-your-rights-n85831 [http://perma.cc
/4GQD-H6W6] (discussing Cheerios's decision to alter its arbitration clause in response to
consumer pressure). State-court judges might also be able to compel arbitration before the
state agencies by holding that it would be unconscionable to send parties to the arbitration
provider specified in the contract. See Sonic 11, 311 P.3 d at 289-300 (finding arbitration clause
unconscionable because it forced employees to waive their statutory right to an
administrative hearing and instead arbitrate under procedures that were more formal and
less friendly to the claimant).
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arbitration clauses are unconscionable if they include an unreasonable
limitation on damages,' if they impose a "threshold" amount in controversy
before claimants can arbitrate,23 or if they allow a prevailing employer to
recoup attorneys' fees without making the same provision for a prevailing
claimant.' 4 These decisions concerned contract terms that had nothing to do
with the cost, speed, or efficiency of the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the
courts concluded that there was no basis for the FAA to preempt the state's
determination that these provisions were unconscionable.
B. The FAA Preempts Only Categorical Unconscionability Rules
Other courts have concluded that the FAA has preemptive force only when
states have adopted across-the-board rules requiring some feature of an
arbitration agreement to be held categorically unconscionable. On this view, the
problem with the Discover Bank rule was its breadth; it required the
invalidation of class-arbitration waivers even when they existed within
decidedly pro-consumer contracts "that might .. .otherwise [have been]
conscionable under [state] law."'2 In the wake of Concepcion, some courts have
concluded that as long as judges determine unconscionability through a
context-based, case-by-case approach,26 the FAA will not necessarily preempt a
judicial determination of unconscionability.
The Washington Supreme Court pioneered this approach. In Gandee v.
LDL Freedom Enterprises, Inc., that court considered three terms contained
within the arbitration clause of a debt-adjustment contract: a "loser pays"
provision, a venue provision, and a provision requiring arbitration within
thirty days of the emergence of the dispute. 7 The court also considered the
validity of the contract's severability clauses After separately considering each
of the four clauses "based on the specific facts at issue in the current case,"29 the
Gandee court concluded that the three provisions of the arbitration clause were
substantively unconscionable and that the arbitration clause could not be
22. Harper v. Ultimo, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 418 (Ct. App. 2003).
23. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P. 3d 979 (Cal. 2003).
24. Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773 (Ct. App. 2012).
25. Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P. 3 d 1197, 1203 (Wash. 2013).
26. Id. at 1202-03; see also Saleemi v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 292 P.3d lo8, 113 (Wash. 2013)
(discussing Gandee's case-by-case approach).
27. Gandee, 293 P.3 d at 1200-01.
28. Id. at 1201.
29. Id. at 1203 (emphasis added).
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severed from the contract. To date, the Supreme Court of Missouri" and the
lower courts in California3 have embraced the Gandee approach.
C. The FAA Permits Courts to Interrogate the Conscionability of the Formation
of the Entire Contract
In his seminal article Contract as Thing, Arthur Leff argued that contracts of
adhesion are not actually contracts at all; rather, they are "unilaterally
manufactured commodities" and "products of non-bargaining."32 In Leff's
view, the agreement at issue in Concepcion would best be described not as a
contract but as a product- a "thing" that could be bought and sold, but whose
terms could not be negotiated.33 On this theory, applying unconscionability
analysis to arbitration clauses misstates the problem by committing a
classification error. The significant issue is not whether the arbitration clause is
unconscionable, but rather whether the "contracty thing[]" 4 containing the
arbitration clause can even be classified as a contract.
Some states, while stopping short of classifying contracts as products, have
used similar arguments as a kind of background principle that counsels for
aggressive interrogation of a contract's formation. For example, the Missouri
Supreme Court held in Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans (Brewer II) that the
conscionability of a class-arbitration waiver should be determined by applying
contract law to determine whether the formation of the agreement as a whole
was conscionable. In that case, the court held that a gross imbalance in
bargaining power rendered a consumer arbitration clause unconscionable. The
evidence in that case "demonstrated that no consumer ever successfully had
renegotiated the terms of the title company's arbitration contract.", 6 Eager to
30. Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans (Brewer II), 364 S.W. 3 d 486, 490-91 (Mo. 2012) (en banc),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 191 (2012).
31. See, e.g., Vargas v. Sai Monrovia B, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 742, 753 (Ct. App. 2013).
32. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 147 (1970).
33. Significantly, products can be regulated by the state. For example, a state could decide that if
an agreement to provide cell-phone service cannot be negotiated by the consumer, then that
agreement is actually a product rather than a contract. Such a decision would make this
agreement a non-contract for the purposes of state law, thereby removing the agreement
from under the aegis of the FAA and enabling its direct regulation as a product. Leff notes
that, "when seen as products, ["things"] have been regulated as to quality for quite a long
time. Life insurance contracts, for instance, have been in effect written by deputy insurance
commissioners for years." Id. at 149-50.
34. Id. at 155.
35. Brewer I, 364 S.W.3 d at 490-91.
36. Id. at 493.
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regain some authority over state contracts, judges in New Jersey and Hawaii
have already begun to embrace certain tenets of the Brewer II approach.3 7
Although the Brewer II court framed its approach in the language of
procedural unconscionability, the argument here is similar to Leffts:
negotiation and bargaining are an essential part of contract. If state courts find
that some agreement seems too unfair -for example, if the agreement cannot
be negotiated or altered in any way-then the court could hold that no valid
contract was ever formed. 8 No federal statute can stop a state-court judge from
ruling that a boilerplate agreement containing an arbitration clause is simply
not a contract under state law. Over time, state-court judges concerned with
formation will find that some contracts were validly formed and others were
not. The result will be a body of case law that channels Leffts arguments by
regulating the way in which merchants and employers write their arbitration
clauses.
D. Defining "Arbitration" Narrowly
The FAA applies only to arbitrations.39 Therefore, as Christopher Drahozal
has noted,4' any mode of dispute resolution that does not constitute an
arbitration is not protected by the statute.
The courts of appeals currently are divided over the question of whether to
define "arbitration" under the FAA by reference to state law or by reference to
federal law.41 If "arbitration" can be defined by state law, then a state
legislature would be free to decide that arbitrations must include certain
procedural protections, such as the assistance of counsel or even the availability
of classwide remedies. If an arbitration agreement executed in that state did not
provide such protections, then state judges could hold that the procedure
37. See, e.g., Siopes v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 312 P. 3d 869, 871 (Haw. 2013), as
corrected (Sept. 26, 2013); id. at 896 n.13 (Acoba, J., concurring); NAACP of Camden Cnty.
E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24A.3d777, 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
38. The Brewer II court did not cite or discuss Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 39S, 404 (1967). Some have interpreted Prima Paint to require
that arbitrators, rather than courts, resolve questions relating to the formation of an entire
contract that happens to contain an arbitration clause. For a fuller discussion of Prima Paint,
see infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
39. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see Drahozal, supra note 6, at 172 & nn.lo6-1o7.
40. Drahozal, supra note 6, at 172-73.
41. Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate No. 0510135, 707
F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that four circuits -the First, Second, Sixth, and Tenth -
define "arbitration" by reference to federal common law, while two others -the Fifth and
Ninth - apply state law).
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contemplated by the agreement was not an arbitration and therefore was not
protected by the FAA. After making such a finding, the state court would be
free to strike down the "agreement" on any grounds it desired.
Some state courts have already taken steps in this direction. For example,
California courts have concluded that, under California law, "arbitration"
requires a neutral decision maker; when decision-making processes have called
for biased arbitrators, the California courts have held that the process was not
an "arbitration" and was therefore not governed by the FAA.'
II. APPLYING DURESS DOCTRINE TO FORCED-ARBITRATION
CLAUSES
Nothing in the FAA prevents courts from invalidating forced-arbitration
clauses on the basis of "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability."43  Thus, claimants challenging such an
arbitration clause may be able to avoid federal preemption if they frame their
defense in the language of formation rather than in the language of
unconscionability. As of 2014, however, many litigants (and judges) are
making the right arguments with the wrong words. In Brewer II, for example,
the Missouri Supreme Court found an arbitration agreement unconscionable
since it was non-negotiable and one-sided.4 That opinion could have framed
this power imbalance as a formation issue (duress) rather than as a public-
policy issue (unconscionability).
The threshold question of who should adjudicate these contract defenses -
the court or the arbitrator-is a difficult one. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that "a federal court
may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the
agreement to arbitrate."' Under Prima Paint's "separability doctrine,"
questions relating to the making of the entire contract cannot be heard by a
court and must instead be resolved by the arbitrator.46 Although authorities are
42. Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assoc., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 875 (Ct. App. 1996).
43. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
44. Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans (Brewer II), 364 S.W.3 d 486,493-94 (Mo. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 191 (2012).
45. 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
46. Id. at 403-04; see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (providing that a court must order arbitration once
"satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue"); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 44o, 443 (2006)
(discussing this doctrine).
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divided on the question,47 there are good reasons to believe that courts can hear
contract-defense claims that apply to both the arbitration clause and the
contract generally. 4 A full dissection of this "much-litigated"49 and "hotly
contested"5 question is beyond the scope of this Comment. But even if parties
are not able to litigate the duress argument outlined below, they can make still
the same argument to their arbitrator."
Notwithstanding Prima Paint, a number of state courts have recently
refused to uphold arbitration agreements on the grounds that the contract
containing them was not validly formed. 2 That trend must now be expanded.
47. Compare Nagrampa v. MailCoups Inc., 469 F. 3d 1257, 1263-64 (9 th Cit. 2006) (en banc)
(holding that the court could reach the merits of a claim that an arbitration clause was
entered under duress even though the same argument could have applied to the contract
generally), with In re RLS Legal Solutions, LLC, 221 S.W. 3d 629, 632 (Tex. 2007) (per
curiam) ("Unless the arbitration provision alone was singled out from the other provisions,
the claim of duress goes to the agreement generally and must be decided in arbitration."),
Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 397 (5th Cit. 20o6) (similar), and Green Tree Fin.
Corp. of Alabama v. Wampler, 749 So. 2d 409, 414 (Ala. 1999) (similar).
48. See Alan Scott Rau, "Separability" in the United States Supreme Court, 2006 STOCKHOLM INT'L
ARB. REV. 1, 14 ("[I]t should be obvious that a challenge can be 'to the arbitration clause
itself" without being 'specifically to the arbitration provision"' (quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. at
445, 449)); Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About "Separability" in
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 17-18 (2003) [hereinafter Rau,
Everything You Really Need to Know] (suggesting that the Prima Paint decision "preserves for
the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an agreement to arbitrate into question"); Stephen
J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 83, 130 (1996);
see also Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy, Cooperation and
Curtailment of State Power, 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 196-97 (1999) ("Rarely will
predatory conduct, such as duress or overreaching, focus specifically on an arbitration
provision."); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REv.
819, 841 n.131 (2003) (collecting authorities critical of Prima Paint).
49. Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know, supra note 48, at 2.
so. David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, io6 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 408 n.55 (2012).
51. But see Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1, 24 (1997) ("[A]rbitrators are even less likely to void purported
arbitration agreements than are courts."); see id. at 24 & n.89 (noting that arbitrators have a
financial incentive to dismiss formation defenses). Some claimants have gone so far as to
raise duress arguments in court proceedings seeking to confirm an arbitrator's award. See,
e.g., ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Tyler, No. 917660, 1994 WL 879497, at *6-7 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. lO, 1994) (declining to confirm an arbitrator's award on the grounds that
the defendants had entered the contract containing the arbitration clause under economic
duress).
52. See, e.g., Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 502 (Ct. App. 2012)
(unconscionable formation of contract); Siopes v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 312 P.3d
869, 884 (Haw. 2013), as corrected (Sept. 26, 2013) (lack of mutual assent); NAACP of
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Courts should employ the theory of "economic duress" to hold that no valid
contract can be formed when an offeror proposes a take-it-or-leave-it deal
requiring the offeree to either (i) consent to a nonnegotiable contract clause
requiring arbitration of all disputes or else (2) forego something that a
reasonable person would deem necessary for modern life. 3 Such a deal is a
Hobson's choice, not a contract.
Traditionally, the doctrine of duress applied only when the contract was
signed under physical coercion or threat. Over the course of the last several
decades, however, courts and scholars have expanded the concept of duress. In
modern courts, claims of "economic duress" are commonplace., 4 Although the
"vagueness of the concept of economic duress""5 has been widely bemoaned,
courts evaluating economic-duress claims usually consider the terms of the
challenged contract in order to determine whether "a party with superior
bargaining power coerce[d] the other party into agreeing to a contract out of
severe economic necessity.", 6 In many state and federal courts, economic-
duress claims are evaluated under a "no reasonable alternative" test.' Under
this framework, courts will interrogate the terms offered to the party alleged to
have violated the contract. If the court finds that this party had no reasonable
Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 794 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(same); Figueroa v. THI of New Mexico at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 306 P.3d 480, 491
(N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (unconscionable formation of contract); see also York v. Dodgeland of
Columbia, Inc., 749 S.E.2d 139, 145 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing that, under the FAA,
state courts can refuse to enforce an arbitration clause if no "meeting of the minds to
arbitrate existed").
s3. Justice Breyer hinted at a duress theory in his Concepcion dissent, but this option has not yet
been fully explored in the literature. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
176o (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If California had applied its law of duress to void an
arbitration agreement, would it matter if the procedures in the coerced agreement were
efficient?").
54. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal Prods. Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Mich.
2000); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971); Capps v. Ga. Pac.
Corp., 453 P.2d 935, 938 (Or. 1969). Some jurists have recognized the similar formation
defense of "moral duress." The Illinois courts, for example, have long held that parties
should be able to claim "moral duress" to void contracts that allowed the superior party to
"[take] undue advantage of the business or financial stress or extreme necessities or
weakness of another." Rees v. Schmits, 164 Il. App. 250, 258 (1911); see also Chicago & A.R.
Co. v. Chicago, V. &W. Coal Co., 79 Ili. 121, 130 (1875) (early use of moral-duress theory).
55. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561, 629
(1983).
S6. Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass
of Contract Policing, 96 Ky. L.J. 1, 26-27 (2008).
57. Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REv. 443,
448 (2005); see also id. at 474-75 & nn.184-189 (collecting cases applying this test).
124:233 2014
CONTRACT AFTER CONCEPCION
choice other than to consent to the terms offered, then the court will hold that
no valid contract was ever formed.
The precise elements of an economic-duress claim vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Many courts require a showing that the party with superior
bargaining power committed a wrongful act, threatened the party with inferior
bargaining power, or otherwise engaged in oppressive or coercive behavior' 8
Forced arbitration satisfies this requirement. In the context of employment
arbitration, the wrongful act may be refusing to grant or continue employment
unless the employee agrees to waive her right to litigate employment disputes
before a court or an administrative agency. 9 In the context of consumer
arbitration, the wrongful act may be the merchant's refusal to make an
essential service available unless consumers agree to arbitrate all disputes
arising under some nonnegotiable contract. Given that economic duress is a
court-made concept, courts could also loosen or even suspend the wrongful-act
requirement in the forced-arbitration context, where the equities so strongly
favor the claimant.
Although the economic-duress defenses outlined above are colorable under
existing law, these defenses would be nearly foolproof under the broader
theories of duress that have been advanced by some feminist scholars. These
theories suggest that duress claims should focus not just on economic
conditions, but also on the power imbalance between the parties. Deborah
Waire Post has argued that, "[w]hen we discuss only economic duress," we
understate "the role law plays in creating and maintaining structures of
subordination" and prevent the emergence of "a law of contracts that grapples
with inequalities that exist- not just between individuals, but between groups
or classes of people. " 6' Elsewhere, Catharine MacKinnon has noted that
contract law has long been "criticized for abstracting from gender by assuming
an arm's length atomism in transactions, and for presupposing behaviors and
s8. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 57 (Ist Cir. 1986); Fees v. Mut. Fire &
Auto. Ins. Co., 490 N.W.2d 55 , 58 (Iowa 1992).
5g. See, e.g., Standard Coffee Serv. Co. v. Babin, 472 So. 2d 124, 125 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that an arbitration clause was obtained through duress when an employer threatened
dismissal if employee refused to sign); In re RLS Legal Solutions, L.L.C., 156 S.W.3d 16o,
165 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an arbitration clause was obtained through duress
when an employer withheld wages until an employee agreed to arbitrate), rev'd, 221 S.W. 3d
629 (Tex. 2007); supra note 21 (discussing Sonic Irs suggestion that forcing employees to
waive their right to an administrative hearing on an employment dispute is
unconscionable).
6o. Deborah Waire Post, Outsider Jurisprudence and the "Unthinkable" Tale: Spousal Abuse and the
Doctrine of Duress, 26 U. lAw. L. REv. 469, 483 (2004).
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forms of power that imagine and favor men over women." 6' Building on these
observations, Orit Gan has argued for "the development of a broader, more
complex duress doctrine that is sensitive to social inequality and context and
that includes aggrieved parties' experiences and perspectives. ",62 This theory
would allow judges to deploy duress doctrine to void all sorts of contracts -
ranging from spousal agreements to mortgages to forced-arbitration clauses.6 3
State courts have already begun to explore the application of duress
doctrine to forced-arbitration clauses. Although the majority of these courts
have dismissed the economic-duress argument, 64 a few have been receptive.
6
,
Those hostile to the duress argument often insist that, despite the adhesive
nature of forced-arbitration clauses, consumers simply are not "deprived ... of
their free will" when they agree to arbitrate.66 The Supreme Court itself has
repeatedly insisted that arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion." 6' But
the Supreme Court's "hypnotic" 6 obsession with consent is impossible to
square with the facts on the ground. Given the near ubiquity of forced-
arbitration clauses, it has now become routine to offer consumers an all-or-
nothing option to either accept a forced-arbitration clause or else forego some
commodity that is necessary "to live in the twenty-first century." 6, In such
61. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, loo YALE L.J. 1281, 1295
(1991); see also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1024-36 (1985).
62. Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 171, 171 (2013).
63. Id. at 207-08.
64. See, e.g., Bama's Best Housing, Inc. v. Hodges, 847 So. 2d 300, 304 (Ala. 2002); Richards v.
Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 62 P. 3d 32o, 326-30 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Vickery Transp.,
Inc. v. HEPACO, Inc., No. W200 3-o1512-COA-R3CV, 2004 WL 2280421, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Oct. 4, 2004).
65. See, e.g., In re RLS Legal Solutions, L.L.C., 156 S.W.3d 16o, 165 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). This
opinion was later reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, which held that the arbitrator
should have decided the duress question. 221 S.W.3d at 631. See also Ex parte Early, 8o6 So.
2d 1198, 1202 (Ala. 2001) (vacating an order compelling arbitration and remanding for
further proceedings on an economic-duress claim); ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Tyler,
No. 91766o, 1994 WL 879497, at *6-7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 1o, 1994).
66. Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
67. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (quoting Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
68. Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know, supra note 48, at s.
69. Allan B. Diamond, Remarks at the 2014 American Constitution Society National
Convention: Your Day in Court? The Undermining of Access to Justice, at 14:21-15:22,




cases, the duress doctrine should be viewed as a valid defense to the forced-
arbitration clause.
Consider, for example, regional monopolies. Many areas are serviced by
one Internet service provider,' one public utility, one hospital, or one airline.
The contracts used by these monopolies often contain a forced-arbitration
clause to which consumers must agree before receiving an essential service. For
instance, many Americans live in areas where the only provider of cellular
service is either Sprint or AT&T-both of which require the consumer to
"consent" to arbitration.' When asked to enforce these arbitration clauses, a
judge should apply the "no reasonable alternative" test to hold that the
consumer entered the contract for the essential good under duress and
therefore no contract was ever actually formed. Such a holding would be a
logical extension of previous cases holding that a company's status as the sole
supplier of a particular product may subject the company to economic-duress
claims in certain circumstances7'2
But the problem is not limited to regional monopolies. Consumers often
find that they have a choice of suppliers but no choice whether to arbitrate.
Suppose, for example, that a consumer wants cable television but is not happy
with the mandatory arbitration clause in her contract with Comcast.73 This
consumer likely has no alternative options. All of America's leading cable
70. See Schnuerle v. Insight Commc'ns Co., 376 S.W. 3d 561, 566 (Ky. 2012) (discussing
arbitration clause in contracts with "the only local broadband cable Internet provider" in
Jefferson County, Kentucky).
71. Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T § 2.2, http://www.att.com/shop/legalterms.html?toskey
=wirelessCustomerAgreement&#disputeResolutionByBindingArb [http ://perma.cc/Y93Z
-AQKP]; Terms and Conditions, SPRINT SOLUTIONS INC., http://www.citizen.org/documents
/Sprint-Forced-Arb-Contract.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ZVK-HS3H]. In some areas, such as
northwest Connecticut, Verizon is the only cell-service provider. Shako Liu, Verizon 4G
Network to Enter Northwest Corner's Dead Zone, LITCHFIELD CNTY. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 2014, http://
www.countytimes.com/articles/2o14/o2/o3/news/doc52fo12b19356e696173898.txt [http://
perma.cc/FC7L-59CE]. That company requires its customers either to arbitrate disputes or
to bring individual actions in small-claims court. Customer Agreement,
VERIZON, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/support/customer-agreement [http://perma
.cc/EW8W-SEZS].
72. See, e.g., Thomas Constr. Co. ofMo. v. Kelso Marine, Inc., 639 F.2d 216, 220 & n.4 (5th Cir.
Mar. 1981) (successful economic-duress claim involving general contractor's dealings with
the only bulk concrete supplier in the area); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal
Products Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 861, 875 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (economic-duress claim involving
GMC's sole supplier of seat frames); Hous., Inc. v. Weaver, 246 S.E.2d 219, 226 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1978), affd, 251 S.E.2d 457 (N.C. 1979) (successful economic-duress claim involving
defendant's "status as sole supplier of stone" in the area).
73. Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, COMCAST § 13(f)(2), http://www.comcast.com
/Corporate/Customers/Policies/SubscriberAgreement.html [http://perma.cc/PF54-6RHS].
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providers - Comcast, TimeWarner,74  Charter Communications,7' and
AT&T 6 - require individual arbitration of disputes, although some of these
providers allow customers to opt out of arbitration by notifying the company
within thirty days of beginning service.77 And although the problem is
particularly pronounced in the area of cable and telecommunications,
forced arbitration is becoming so widespread that in many industries
... it is not possible to shop around for a product or service that doesn't
require forced arbitration. Today it is increasingly difficult to find
insurance, a credit card, cell phone, a brokerage for a retirement
account, or a nursing home, for example, where forced arbitration isn't
required.78
Thus, despite the Supreme Court's attempt to pull the wool over the nation's
eyes, it is clear that Americans are not binding themselves to arbitrations by
choice. They "consent" to these arbitration clauses because they don't know
what else to do.
CONCLUSION
Writing near the end of the recent financial crisis, John Lanchester
observed that "[m]odern banks are creations of the state, made by our choices,
and we can shape them any way we want. It's time to make our banks do the
74. Residential Services Subscriber Agreement, TIMEWARNER § 15(b), http://help.twcable.com
/RSSAEnglish.pdf [http ://perma.cc/3TD-RFJH ].
75. Charter Communications Terms and Conditions of Residential Service,
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, https://www.charter.com/browse/content/residential-video
[http://perma.cc/6N4F-B6NT].
76. AT&T U-verse Voice and TV Terms of Service, AT&T 5 u(a), http://www.att.com/u-verse/att
-terms-of-service.jsp [http://perma.cciPR53-7ZB4].
7. See Comcast Terms, supra note 73, § 13(c); Charter Terms, supra note 75; TimeWarner Terms,
supra note 74, § i5(e). Cox Communications, another leading company, does not make its
user agreement for cable available online. DirectTV, a leading provider of satellite
television, requires arbitration and does not allow its customers to opt out.
Customer Agreement, DiRECTTV § 9(c), http://www.directv.con/earnVpdf/o4z411_customer
-agreement for web.pdf [http://perma.cc/S4NS-ZVMF].
78. Forced Arbitration, NAT'L Ass'N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, http://www.naca.net/issues
/forced-arbitration [http://perma.cc/GVR-KA7E] (emphasis added). For a list of
companies requiring arbitration in each of these industries, see Forced Arbitration Rouges




things we need." 79 The same can be said for contracts. Many have argued that
the proliferation of forced-arbitration clauses has stripped lay claimants of
basic procedural protections and given big business the ability to abuse
consumers without fear of class-action liability. Some state-court judges,
sympathetic to this position, have illuminated a path forward by explaining
how to limit the federal colonization of contract law. Their innovations should
now be embraced and expanded.
This Comment has explored the ways in which state-court judges, locked
in a tug-of-war with the Supreme Court, have reacted to Concepcion. These
judges have held that FAA preemption does not apply when state courts
regulate arbitration without disturbing its fundamental attributes; when state
courts use a contextual approach to unconscionability; when state courts
interrogate the formation of the contract as a whole; or when state courts find
that the procedure specified in some agreement does not actually constitute an
arbitration. This Comment has also suggested that courts and arbitrators
should apply the doctrine of duress to hold that certain "contracts" containing
forced-arbitration clauses were never validly formed and therefore cannot be
enforced.
Even if state courts do not embrace the particular theories outlined above,
they should continue to explore the legal space left open by Concepcion. Indeed,
despite recent judicial innovations, there remains much cause for pessimism.
For so long as the current majority remains on the Supreme Court, Americans
must live with a troubling reality: that nearly that every action they take - right
down to eating a bowl of Cheerioss° - could constitute a waiver of their right to
enter a court.
JAMES DAWSON.
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